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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION-VALIDITY OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
ON NONRESIDENT CORPORATION UNDER MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTE-The plain-

tiff sued the defendant nonresident corporation for an injury caused by an automobile owned and operated by a licensed resident agent of the defendant.
Substituted service was made under a statute I upon the proper public official of
Rhode Island as "attorney for acceptance of process" on behalf of the defendant.
Held, that the defendant was not a "nonresident" operator within the terms of
the statute. Clesas v. Hurley Machine Co., 157 Atl. 426 (R. I., 1931).
The states' lack of personal jurisdiction over nonresident motorists who were
the cause of serious accidents was early met by legislation designed to regulate
the use of state roads by making an express compliance with fixed statutory
provisions a prerequisite to their lawful use, on the doctrine that any nonconformant could be excluded from the highways.2 This theory of power to exclude,
already applied as to foreign corporations, 3 served as the basis for a flood of
enactments, which deemed the doing of certain acts, i. e., using the highways, as
equivalent to the"appointment of a public officer to accept service on behalf of
the absent defendant, without any express consent on his part.4 The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained, 5 with the proviso, that the exercise of
jurisdiction had to be reasonable.6 Justification for such service on the defendant
was found in the fact that it was a normal exercise of the police power and the
only practicable method of dealing with a perplexing social problem.7 The
I R. I. GEN. LAws (i923) c. 98, § 14, as amended by Pub. Laws 1927, c. 1O5O, p. 250,
providing that the operation of a motor vehicle within the state by a nonresident, his servant
or agent, will be deemed equivalent to the appointment of a named public official to accept
service on his behalf, in a proceeding growing out of such operation. Statutes of a similar
nature have been enacted in about 20 states.
2
N. J. Comp. STATS. (I910), Motor Vehicles, 1art IV, § 16, p. 3431. Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (I916), upheld statute requiring nonresident motorist
to make formal appointment of a public official to receive service of process. Md. Laws of
1910, c. 207, § 133, p. 168. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 6IO, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (914),
sustained validity of registration requirement imposed on nonresident motorist. See also,
In re Opinion of Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925).
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344
(1917); Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y.
1915) conferred jurisdiction over foreign corporation by virtue of its doing business.
'Supra note I.
1 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927). GooDRIcH, CONFLICt OF
LAws (1927) 143: "It is not accurate to speak of this jurisdiction as based on consent. It
may be doubtful if the out of the state visitor knows of the provision, much less consents
to it. It must be said that when he does acts (at least some kind of acts) in a state, it lies
within the power of that state to make him amenable to its courts in litigation arising from
those acts." CONFLiCr OF LAWS RESTATEmENT (Am. Law Inst. 1930), § 82 (e), i1O: "He
has by acts done or events caused by him within the state subjected himself to the jurisdiction." Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 563, 572.
'Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (i928), declared unconstitutional,
as contrary to due process, a New Jersey statute (P. L. 1924, c. 232, p. 517) which contained
no requirement for notifying the nonresident defendant of the suit against him. Cf amendment, N. J. Laws 1927, c. 232, p. 441, sustained in Dwyer v. Volmar Trucking Corp., IO5
N. J. L. 518, 146 Atl. 685 (1929). In general, see MacDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37
Sup. Ct. 343 (1917).
Hess v. Pawloski, slepra note 5, at 356, 47 Sup. Ct. at 633: "In the public interest the
state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part
of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways." Accord: Shushereba v.
Ames, 255 N. Y. 490, 175 N. E. 187 (1931); Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 Atl. 255
(1931) ; MacDonald v. Newman, 154 Atl. 259 (Conn., 1931). Cf. Aversa v. Aubry, 303 Pa.
139, 154 Atl. 311 (1931). See comment on Hess v. Pawloski in (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
93, and (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 415.
(909)
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instant case, even though the statute in question specifically referred to "operation by a nonresident, his servant or agent", 8 refused to extend this broad principle so as to include a nonresident corporation. Other courts, faced with the
similar question of the vicarious responsibility of a nonresident, individual principal, have had no hesitation in declaring him to be the "operator"." As several
decisions have enunciated,10 the reason of the rule applies with even greater force
to a corporation, since the latter can act only through agents. Once the agency
is conceded, the agent's ownership of the car and his residence within the state
should be immaterial, in a suit against the nonresident corporation. The same
reason of public policy exists, in either case, for sanely regulating the performance
of a dangerous act, and any hardship foisted upon the defendant by compelling
him to come into the state to defend, is easily counterbalanced by the equally
onerous burden which would otherwise be thrown upon the plaintiff to pursue
and serve the mobile defendant."' The effect of the decision in the instant case
may be minimized by placing it on the ground of a peculiarity in the local statute.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-RECEIVERS--EXTRATERRITORIAL E'NFORCEMENT OF
SHAREHOLDER'S STATUTORY LIABILITY-Plaintiff, liquidator (receiver) of a

Florida bank, brought suit in New Jersey against defendant, a shareholder,
to enforce an assessment imposed pursuant to a Florida statute ' making shareholders liable for an amount equal to the par value of their shares. A New Jersey
statute 2 prohibited the bringing of such an action. Held, that the action could
not be maintained; the plea of the New Jersey statute is a good defense. Cochrane v. Morris, 157 Atl. 652 (N. J. 1931).
There is much conflict in the decisions of the courts as to whether statutes
imposing extra liability on shareholders of corporations can be enforced in other
jurisdictions. One group of courts, led by New York and New Hampshire,
refused extraterritorial enforcement of the provisions of a Kansas statute,
on the ground that the statute provided for a remedy which the courts of the
forum were unable to afford the suitor.' Other courts, in construing similar
'R. I. LAws, mtpra note I.
'Bigham v. Foor, 2oi N. C. 14, 158 S. E. 548 (193i); O'Tier v. Sell, 226 App. Div.
434 at 438, 235 N. Y. Supp. 534 at 538 (1929) : "A person struck by a car is just as badly

injured if the owner is at the wheel as he would be if his servant or permittee is driving the
machine, and vice versa, and the reason for making it possible to bring him within the jurisdiction of the courts of this State would be the same in both instances." This decision is
particularly liberal in view of the fact that the statute refers only to operation by the nonresident himself.
"Bischoff v. Win. Schnepp, Inc., 139 Misc. 293, 294, 249 N. Y. Supp. 49, 5o, (1930);
Dwyer v. Volmar Trucking Corp., supra note 6; Bessan v. Public Service Coordinated
Transport, 135 Misc. 368, 237 N. Y. Supp. 689 (1929).
' See Scott, Jurisdiction aver Nonresident Motorists, supra note 5.
13 FL. GEN. LA-ws (Skillman, 1927) § 6059: "Stockholders of every banking company
shall be individually responsible equally and rateably and not for one another for all contracts, debts and engagements of such company to the extent' of the amount of their stock
therein at the par value thereof in addition to the amount invested in such shares."
22 N. J. CoMP. STAT. (1gio) p. 1656, par. 94 (b) : "No action . . . shall be maintained
in any court of law of this state . . . to enforce any statutory personal liability . . . if such,
statutory personal liability be created by or arise from the statutes or laws of any other
state . . ."
'There is a scarcity of periodical literature on the subject. See Kuhn, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of Statutes Imposing Double Liability Upon Stockholders (19o8) 17
YALE L. J. 457. See also (1897) 34 L. R. A. 737.
' Crippen v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 540, 44 Atl. 538 (89) ; Marshall v. Sherman, 148
N. Y. 9, 42 N. E. 419 (895), followed in Wright v. Weil, 139 Misc. 114, 246 N. Y. Supp.
417 (193o). The Marshall case was relied on by the court in the instant case, though the
Kansas and Florida statutes are distinguishable. The latter provides for no remedy which
the New Jersey courts cannot afford.
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statutes, allowed recovely, 5 and the United States Supreme Court decided that
the full faith and credit clause demanded such extraterritorial recognition.6
All the courts admitted that the liability was not penal in nature; 7 if it were,
there would be no doubt about refusing recovery.8 The right was deemed either
statutory or contractual. A further problem was presented to some of the courts
when the suit was brought by a receiver. The general proposition is that a
receiver has no absolute right to sue outside the state in which he is appointed.'
The courts hurdled this objection by calling the receiver a "quasi-assignee" for
the benefit of creditors,' 0 who may maintain such a suit, since he has the legal
interest in the cause of action." On principle, the courts of all states ought to
be open for the enforcement of rights granted by any state. Uniformity of obligation is a desirable end, despite the existence, in theory, of forty-eight independent sovereignties. When the citizens of one state invest their money in
another state, they should take the burdens of such an investment as well as the
benefits. The imposition of double liability on corporate shareholders ought not
to offend the public policy of the forum. For these reasons, the New Jersey
statute is most unfortunate; it places a premium on being a citizen of New
Jersey. In view of the statute, however, the result of the instant case is legally
sound, though practically undesirable.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE-BURDEN OF PROOF IN
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Plaintiff sued in New Hampshire for personal

injuries resulting from an accident occurring in Vermont.

By the law of Ver-

mont, the plaintiff must prove he was not contributorily negligent. In New
Hampshire, however, contributory negligence is an affirmative defense to be
established by the defendant. Held, that since by Vermont law the burden of
proving contributory negligence was a matter of substance and not procedure,
the burden was on plaintiff to show its absence. Precourt v. Driscoll, 157 Atl.
525 (N. H. 1931) .
The general rule is unquestioned that the lex loci governs all questions as to
the plaintiff's substantive rights, while matters pertaining to the procedure incident to enforcing those rights are controlled by the lex fori.1 The majority
489, 52 N. E.346 (1898) ; Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 172
'Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill.
Mass. 39, 5I N. E. 207 (898) ; Crowley v. Goudy, 173 Minn. 6o3, 218 N. W. 121 (1928).

See Pacific Guano & Fertilizer Co. v. Opolinsky, 135 Misc. 265, 237 N. Y. Supp. 682 (1929),
where the court distinguished Marshall v. Sherman, supra note 4, inenforcing a statutory liability imposed by a California statute. The court expressly said that the Marshall case was
so decided because of the peculiarity of the remedy provided for in the Kansas statute.
' Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912). See Whitman v. Oxford
National Bank, 176 U. S.559 at 563, 20 Sup. Ct. 477 at 478 (i9oo); where, the court justified extraterritorial enforcement of such statutes in this language: "Whatever else may be
said about the remedy, it is direct, certain and available to every creditor of a corporation,
and leaves to the stockholders the adjustment between themselves of their respective individual shares of the corporate obligations. In view of the present tendency to carry on
business through corporate instrumentalities and the freedom from personal liability which
attends ordinary corporate action, it cannot be said that this limited additional remedy is
open to judicial condemnation".
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (892) ; Bagley v. Tyler, 43 Mo.
App. i95 (i89I); Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119 (1871); 2 MoRAwvEZ, PvrsArz CoRPoRAlioxs (2d ed. 1886) § 877.
"GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws (i927) §8.
'Booth v. Clark, 58 U. S.322 (i855) ; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 8, § 192.
oConverse v. Hamilton, supra note 6.
2Hawkins

222 (1880).

v. Glenn, I31 U. S.319, 9 Sup. Ct. 739 (1889) ; Relfe v. Rundle, io3 U. S.

%Northern Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. xgo (1894); Louisville & Nashville
R. R. v. Whitlow's Adm., IO5 Ky. 1,43 S.W. 711 (i88); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws
(1927)

§ 81.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

of courts and text-writers have considered the burden of proving contributory
negligence as a procedural rather than a substantive matter. 2 This view is supported on the ground that such a rule merely regulates the manner in which a
plaintiff must prove his case and does not alter the nature of his right to recovery.
The opposite position, that a rule requiring the plaintiff to show his due care is
substantive, is strongly recommended by the argument of the court in the instant
case. It was there pointed out that such a rule makes the plaintiff's due care
an essential element of his cause of action, just as vital to its validity as proof
of the defendant's negligence, and hence clearly affects his substantive right. 3
A more strictly conflict of laws point is raised by the action of the court when it
looked to the decisions of Vermont to see whether the rule in question was one
of substance or procedure. This is contrary to the Restatement rule,4 but upon
analysis appears to be more in conformity with the general principles of conflict
of laws.5 Certainly if this subject deals with the enforcement of foreign-created
rights a court should look to the decisions of the foreign state to see what those
rights are. It is quite possible that under the Restatement view we may find a
court refusing to enforce a foreign-created right, or, what is more striking,
enforcing a right which never existed in the sister state, merely because the law
of the forum considers the foreign rule creating or denying the right to be
procedural rather than substantive. 6 It is unfortunate that the majority of courts
have failed to recognize the logical necessity of deciding what law will determine
to the
whether a given rule is one of substance or procedure as a preliminary
7
ultimate question of whether that rule will be applied by the forum.

CRIMES-FALSE PRETENSES-CREDIBILITY OF PRETENSE-In order to obtain
money, the defendant, a physician, had falsely represented to the prosecutor,

who was a detective, that by means of his "radio equipment" he had diagnosed
the disease of the sister of the prosecutor as cancer and that by the same means
he could cure this ailment. In fact the prosecutor had no sister. On being
indicthd, the defendant was convicted of an attempt to obtain money under false
pretenses. Held, that the conviction could not be sustained because the representations were not calculated to deceive a person of ordinary caution. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 157 Atl. 625 (Pa. i93).
Under the typical statute in force in most jurisdictions the crime of obtaining
goods by false pretenses consists of (i) the false pretense; (2) an obtaining of
2
Duggan v. Bay State R. Co., 230 Mass. 370, 119 N. E. 757 (1918) ; Jenkins v. Minneapolis, etc. R. Co., 124 Minn. 368, 145 N. W. 40 (1914) ; Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y.
62, 109 N. E. lO9 (1915); Wallace v. Western N. C. R. Co., 1O4 N. C. 442, io S. E. 552
(1889) ; Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 5; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1901) 486; WHARTON,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 19o5) 11o7.
3 1.57 Atl. 525, 528. Accord: Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 512, 35 Sup.
Ct. 865, 867 (1915) ; Barnet v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 222 N. Y. 195, 18 N. E. 625 (1918).
' "The forum determines what is matter of procedure and what is matter of substance

according to its own law."

CONFLIcr OF LAWS RESTATEMENT,

Tentative Draft No. 5 (Am.

L. Inst. 1929) § 613.

"As used in this Subject, the word jurisdiction means the power of a state to create
rights which under the principles of the common law will be recognized as valid in other
states." CONFLICT OF LAwS RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 43; BEALE, CASES 0N THE CONFLiCT OF LAws (2d ed. 1928) 501.

'St. Louis R. Co. v. Coy, 113 Ark. 265, 168 S. W. iio6 (1914) (by the law of Missouri
refund of the consideration received under a release was a matter of substance going to the
right of action for fraud in procuring the release. Releasee who had not refunded was
allowed to sue in Arkansas on the ground that the matter of refund related to the remedy
only by the law of the forum).
McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in Conflict of Laws (1930) 78
U. OF PA. L. REv. 933, 936.
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property by that pretense; (3) an intent to defraud.' This pretense must
include not merely a promise of future conduct but the representation of an
existing fact. 2 In the principal case the court was uncertain whether representations of ability to diagnose and cure disease by means of radio activity were not
merely "expressions of opinion and promises of future conduct", 3 although a
pretense of supernatural powers has been held sufficient.4 Setting aside this
point, the court based its decision on the ground that the representations were
not such as would have deceived the ordinary man of common prudence. This, in
fact, was the requirement that early interpretations of the statutes read into the
acts," but it was later recognized that such construction defeated the very purpose
of the statute. The rule generally applied today is that the offense comes within
the meaning of the statute when the pretense has successfully deceived the particular individual upon whom it was practised.6 Such a construction is obviously
the only practical one since the adoption of the other would be to encourage
the victimizing of those who always are the natural prey of perpetrators of
fraudulent schemes. The object of the statute is to protect the weak and guileless as well as those capable of protecting themselves. By protecting only the
latter we leave at large the typical "fraud" who plays on the credulity of the
naturally gullible. Even in the jurisdiction of the court of the instant case these
consequences have been recognized and the now generally accepted rule applied,
which fact was apparently not noticed.7 To revert to the earlier rule, as this
court did, is to disregard both a. consideration of the purpose of the statute and
the previous judicial pronouncements on the subject.8
§ 7847;

1014; IND. ANN.
1918) 363; Commonwealth v. Moore, 89 Ky. 542,
1:2 S. W. io66 (189o); Thomas v. State, 9o Ga. 437, 16 S. E. 94 (1892).
'A statement by the defendant that by means of radio treatment he could cure a case of
'PA.

STAT. (Supp. 1928)

MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924)

STAT. (Burns, i926) §2947.
CRIMINAL LAW (Mikell's ed.
'CLARK,

cancer has been held in a lower court of Pennsylvania a statement of fact and not merely of
opinion. Commonwealth v. Howard, 24 Pa. Dist. 1075 (914).
"The alleged existing fact, is that he then and there had the supernatural and extraordinary power to cure in the manner he claimed . . . it is apparent that there is a false representation as well as a promise-a false representation of an existing fact and a promise to
cure in the future." Jules v. State, 85 Md. 305, 36 Atl. 1O27 (1897) ; Regina v. Giles, I69
Reprints 1490" (1865) ; Commonwealth v. Keeper County Prison, 15 W. N. 282 (Pa. 1884).
Commonwealth v. Herman, 15 Phila. 386 (1881) ; City of Chicago v. Westergren 173 Ill.
App. 562 (1912).
;State v. Burnett, i19 Ind. 392, 21 N. E. 972 (1889); Commonwealth v. Hickey, 2
Pars. Eq. Cas. 317 (1843) ; State v. Hood, i9 Del. 418, 53 Atl. 437 (19O1) ; cf. Note (19o3)
3 COL L. REV. 204.
'Lefler v. State, 153 Ind. 82, 54 N. E. 439 (809); State v. Southall, 77 Minn. 296,
; People v. Summers, 115 Mich.
79 N. W. 1007 (1899) ; State v. Mills, 17 Me. 211 (140)
537, 7.3 N. W. 818 (I898). The question of the reasonableness of the prosecutor's action
should be pertinent only in determining whether the prosecutor relied upon the representation.
State v. Montgomery, -56 Iowa 19i5, 9 N. W. i2O (1881).
"The weak and feeble have equal rights with the strong; and these false pretense
statutes are for the protection of the entire community, composed of persons of all degrees of
mental power and shrewdness, against being, in fact, cheated." BisrOP, CRUMNAL LAW (9th
ed. 1923) § 433; Davidson, What Are Criminal False Pretenses (1877) 25 Am. L. REG.
(N. s.) 321; Note (1887) 26 ALBANY L. J. 105.
It is not necessary that the prosecutor investigate the representations: Commonwealth v.
Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 49 N. E. 91 (1898) ; People v. Smith, 3 Cal. App. 62, 84 Pac. 449
(19o6).
His negligence is immaterial: People v. Crawford, 278 Ill. 134, 115 N. E. 9O1
(1917) ; Crawford v. State, 117 Ga. 247, 43 S. E. 762 (19o3). When the indictment is not
for an attempt the prosecutor must have relied on the pretense. Brafford v. U. S., 259 Fed.
511 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2; so his knowledge of the true facts is
a bar to conviction. Thorp v. State, 4o Tex. Cr. Rep. 346, 50 S. W. 38J (1899).
'Commonwealth v. Daniels, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 332 (1847); Commonwealth v. Poulson,
2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 326 (1847) ; Commonwealth v. Henry, 22 Pa. 253 (1853).
'Regina v. Hensler, II Cox C. 570 (Eng. 187o) ; BIsHop, op. cit. supra note 6 § 488.
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EMINENT DOMAIN-POWER OF ONE PUBLIC UTILITY CORPORATION TO
CONDEMN LAND OF SIMILAR CoRPoRATIoN-Plaintiff sought to enjoin the condemnation of certain of its property by the defendant, which proposed to use it
in the construction of a dam across the Savannah river. Both plaintiff and
defendant were chartered by the state of South Carolina as electric power
companies, though plaintiff had not exercised its franchise for thirty years.
Defendant had been given a general power to take by eminent domain such lands,
etc., as should be necessary to the exercise of its franchise. Held, that an injunction should be denied. Twin City Power Co. v. Savannah River Electric Co., 161
S. E. 750 (S. C. 1930 ').
A grant of the power of eminent domain, which is one of the attributes of
sovereignty most susceptible of abuse and injustice, can be exercised only by
virtue of an express authorization from the legislature. 2 The extent to which the
power may, when granted, be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear
implication of the statute in which the grant is contained. 3 It is well settled that
the legislature may constitutionally authorize the taking of property devoted to
a public use for a different public use.4 However, it is equally well established
that a general delegation of the power of eminent domain to a municipal or private
corporation does not authorize the taking of property already devoted to a public
use, unless it can clearly be inferred from the nature of the improvements authorized, or from the impracticability of constructing them without encroaching upon.
such property, that the legislature intended to authorize such a taking.5 Thus
for the obvious reason that no public purpose or public necessity can be served
thereby, it is held that property of a private corporation devoted to one public
use cannot be taken for the same use.6 In the instant case there was only a general delegation of the power of eminent domain, and both corporations were
chartered to perform the same public service. However, the peculiar circumstances of the case-the fact that the defendant was chartered to operate within
the same district as the plaintiff, to build its dam along the same river, and the
further fact that the franchise of that company would be useless without the land

of the plaintiff-render inescapable the conclusion that the legislative intent was
to authorize this condemnation.' And since the plaintiff had long since ceased
to devote the land to the public purpose for which it originally held it, the decision
is not open to the objection that the land was being condemned for the same
public purpose. The furnishing of electric power was an essential service which
"Although this case was decided Nov. 26, 193o, it was not received for publication until

Dec. io,1931.
IHooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 31 Sup. Ct. 85 (91o) ; State v. Gordon, 36 S. W.
(2d)

1O5

(Mo.

1931).

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 195 U. S. 594, 25 Sup. Ct. ISO
(19o4) ; United States v. Southern Power Co., 31 F. (2d) 852 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
'Laureldale Cemetery Co. v. Reading Co., 3o3 Pa. 315, 154 Atl. 372 (1931); United
States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 16o U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
IState v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., 42 P. (2d) 692 (D. C. Mo. I93O) ; Chicago
and N. W. Ry. v. City of Racine, 20o Wis. 170, 227 N. W. 859 (193o).
'Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92 (189o). The new use, however, must
be identical with the old to make the taking unconstitutional. Property may be taken to
provide a different manner of traveling between the same points, Harrisburg, C. & C. Turnpike Road Co. v. Harrisburg and Mechanicsburg Electric Ry., 177 Pa. 585, 35 At. 85o
(1896) ; or the same mode of travel between different points, Toledo, etc. Ry. v. Detroit, L.
& N. R. Co., 62 Mich. 564, 29 N. W. 500 (1886) ; and a municipal corporation may take the
property of a private corporation for the same purpose, since operation by the public of a
public enterprise may be for the public good. In re Brooklyn, 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983
(1894); aff'd sub. norn. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup.
Ct. 718 (i89W).
"When the only land available for a particular public work specifically authorized by the
legislature is already devoted to a public use, the power to take such land will be inferred,
but not otherwise." Vermont Hydro-Electric Co. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 144, 151, 112 AtI. 223, 227
(1921).
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the legislature wanted continued. This land was not being used to provide that
service, nor was there any prospect that plaintiff would so use it. Under these
circumstances, plaintiff's land was subject to condemnation as freely as property
of a private individual.8

OF
OF WITNESsEs-ADmISSIBILITY
EVIDENCE-COMPETENCY
DECLARATIONS OF SPousE-Defendant was indicted for the murder of

DYING

her husband. After the shooting, deceased told the physician in attendance that he
knew he was going to die, that his wife had shot him, and described the events
leading up to the fatal act. Held, that the dying declaration was admissible.
Brown v. Commonwealth, 43 S. W. (2d) 511 (Ky. 1931).
The rationale behind the admissibility of dying declarations is that there is
frequently no third person present to be an eyewitness to the fact,1 and that
in most cases there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the same facts, so that
if they were not admitted, there would be a miscarriage of justice.2 As a prerequisite to admissibility, however, the declarant must have been competent to
testify, in the sense that he would have been a competent witness if living,"
4
and the subject-matter of the declaration must be of the prescribed sort. Upon
for or
testify
the well-known rule of evidence that one spouse is incompetent to
against the other,5 there were always engrafted the equally well-establishd common law exceptions that such testimony is admissible in cases of wrongs of
violence committed by one against the person of the other, 6 or of sexual offenses
committed by one spouse with a third person.7 Statutes have further restricted
'Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R., 3o Colo. 204, 69 Pac.
.568 (192) ; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., supra note 3.
1I EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1803) 353.
2 1 GREENLEAF, EvIDENCE (Lewis's ed. 1896) § 156.
' "They (the declarations) are substitutes for sworn testimony, and must be such narrative statements as a witness might properly give on the stand if living." People v. Olmstead,
30 Mich. 431, 435 (1874). Accord: Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 469, 5 N. E. 203 (1885) ; Tibbs
v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 558, 128 S. W. 871 (IgIo) ; 2 WIG oPE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923)
§ 1430.
'I. e., (a) the proceeding in which the statements are offered must not be a civil case;
(b) it must be a public prosecution for the specific crime of homicide; (c) the death in question must be the declarant's; (d) the declaration must concern facts leading up to or causing
or attending the injurious act resulting in death; (e) the declarant must be conscious of
impending death and believe in- its certainty, not merely its possibility, at the time of making
the declaration. See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 1432-4. Contra: Bagnall v. Hunt,
79 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 813.
293 Pac. 733 (Kan. 193o) noted in (93)
'The marital is the only family relationship which automatically disqualifies a witness.
Thus, master and servant, father and child, brother and sister, may testify for or against one
another. The disqualification affects all facts concerning the other spouse, regardless of how
knowledge of those facts was acquired. Lide v. State, 133 Ala. 43, 31 So. 953 (1901) ; State
v. Willis, 119 Mo. 485, 24 S. W. I18 (1894) ; Breed v. Gove, 41 N. H. 452 (i86o) ; Pringle
v. Pritigle, 59 Pa. 281 (1868); 4 JONES, EVIDENCE (Ist ed. 1913) §§ 733-4; I WIGMOO,
EVIDENCE §600; 4 ibid. §2227.
'Williams v. State, 149 Ala. 4, 43 So. 720 (i9o7) (assault with intent to murder);
Crump v. Commonwealth, L4 Ky. L. Rep. 450, 20 S. W. 39a (i89a) (homicide); Victor v.
Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 350, 298 S. W. 936 (1927) (rape) ; Commonwealth v. Allen, I91
Ky. 624, 231 S. W. 41 (1921) (abortion) ; State v. Anderson, 252 Mo. 83, 158 S. W. 817
(1913) (assault with intent to kill) ; 4 WIGUoRE § 2239.
State v. Bennett, 31 Iowa 24 (1871) (adultery) ; Lord v. State, 17 Neb. 526, 23 N. W.
507 (1885) (adultery). Some states have adopted statutes to cover the matter: Richardson
v. State, 1O3 Md. 112, 63 AtI. 317 (19o6) (bigamy); Hills v. State, 6I Neb. 589, 85 N. W.
(bigamy). See 4 WIGMORE § 2239836 (190O)
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the scope of this anomalous disqualification,' thus evidencing the desire of the
legislature, as well as of the courts, to limit the extent of the privilege." Such
limitations rest upon the soundest common sense: the reason for the rule of disqualification is the consideration of public policy that connubial dissension would
be engendered, or the danger of perjury augmented, by allowing one spouse to
testify against or for the other, as the case might be."° But when the reason for
the rule fails, the rule should also fail: it is a reductio ad absurdum to argue that
a spouse who is on trial for a crime involving violence to the person of the other
should come under the aegis of the law."- Such a position would be a travesty
upon justice, in that in almost all cases of coniugicide, evidence of the highest
probative value would be taken from the state's case. The decision in the instant
case represents the overwhelming weight of authority on the subject. 2

INCOME TAx-TRUSTS-EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF TRUST IN FUTURE

INcoME-Appellant, a lawyer, executed an instrument reciting that thereafter
one-half of his income should accrue to him as trustee for his wife; that throughout the year it was to be as though no trust had been created, but that he was to
account as trustee to his wife at the end of each year. Held, that he was properly
taxed upon his entire income. Luce v. Burnet, U. S. Daily, Jan. 20, 1932, at 2622
(Ct. of App., D. C. 1932).
Property which is assignable may be the subject matter of a trust.' For tax
purposes, therefore, the assignment and trust cases may be treated as one. One
who expects to earn money under a contract or employment not then existing,
has no present interest which may be assigned or held in trust; 2 and a
declaration of trust of such income creates at most a contract to create a trust,
and only that, if contractual requisites are present.2 However, if there is a contract or employment in existence at the time, there may be an effective assign' The statutes (which are collected in a note to I

WIGIORE § 488)

are mostly codifications

of the common law exceptions, but several new ones have been created, e. g., the testimony
of one spouse is admitted against the other (a) in actions for desertion, (b) in actions by the
wife for failure to support, (c) in controversies concerning the wife's separate estate, (d) in
cases where either has been acting as agent for the other. See 4 WIGMoRE § 224o.
' That the courts are not willing to extend the disqualification is shown by the fact that
"there is no privilege which prevents the surviving spouse from testifying, after the death
of the other in disparagement of the conduct or property of the deceased." 4 WIGINORE § 2237;
Graves v. Graves, 2o Ark. 541, 69 S. W. 544 (19o2) ; State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280, 147
Pac. 828 (1915).
104 TONES, 10c. cit. supra note 6: I WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 6oi; Pringle v.

Pringle, supra note 5.

u"
. if the promotion of marital peace, and the apprehension of marital dissension,
are the ultimate ground of the privilege, it is an overgenerous assumption that the wife who
has been beaten, poisoned, or deserted, is still on such terms of delicate good feeling with her
spouse that her testimony must not be enforced lest the irridescent halo of peace be dispelled by the breath of disparaging testimony." 4 WICIORF § 2239.
'Accord: Moore v. State, 12 Ala. 764 (1848) ; People v. Green, i Denio 614 (N. Y.
1845) ; State v. Belcher, 13 S. C. 459 (i88o). The Federal cases extend the meaning of
"crimes against the person" to include violations of the Mann Act: United States v. Bozeman, 236 Fed. 432 (W. D. Wash. 1916) ; Pappas v. United States, 241 Fed. 665 (C. C. A
9th, 1917) ; Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463 (C. C A. 5th, 1918).
1 I PERRY, TRuSTS (7th ed. 1929)

§ 67.

Valley R. Co. v. Woodring, 116 Pa. 513, 9 Atl. 58 (1887); Shacldeford v.
Kiser Co., x31 Ala. 224, 31 So. 77 (19Ol) ; It Re Ellenborough, [1903] 1 Ch.697; CoNTRACrS
RESTATEmiENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 154; TRusTs RESTATEmENT, Tentative Draft No. T
(Am. L. Inst. 1930) § 74; I Wn.uiSTON, CONTRACTS (1924) 770.
it re Gurlitz, 105 N. Y. Misc. 30, 172 N. Y. Supp. 523 (1918), aff'd, 175 N. Y. Supp.
289 (I919) ; it re Ellenborough; TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 74; both supra note 2.
-Lehigh
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ment or declaration of trust, for in such case there is a present property right.4
Since, in the instant case, the settlor had no contract or employment there was
no res upon which to predicate the trust until after he had received the income. 5
It was, therefore, properly taxable as income received, regardless of what he
might thereafter do with that income.6 The court, however, though reaching a
similar result, did not so analyze the problem, but held that the purpose of the
Act was to tax salaries to those who earned them and not to permit evasion by
anticipating agreements which prevented the salary from vesting, even for a
second, in the one who earned it. 7 It would seem that the Act might do so, but
does it? May not one, in good faith, declare a trust of, or assign, income which
will arise under an existing contract or employment with the result that the
income is properly taxable only to the cestui que trust, or assignee? It has been
so held." So, also, it has been held that the beneficiary of a trust may not be
taxed upon income from the trust after he has made an irrevocable assignment
thereof." It would seem that whether or not there is income tax liability is to
be determined as of the time the income is received.10 In the case supposed, the
legal interest at that time may be only in the cestui que trust on the one hand,
or the assignee on the other.1 ' Unnecessary confusion has been caused by the
failure of the courts to adopt some such approach.
'Ferguson v. Nelson, C. C. A. 3d, decided Feb. 2, 1932, No. 4628; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,

supra note 2. See In re Gurlitz, ibid. But see Heller v. Lutz, 254 Mo. 704, 164 S. W.

123 (1914).

lit re Gurlitz, supra note 3; see authorities cited sufpra note 2; Note

L. REv. 559.

(1929)

42 HARV.

'Magill, The Taxation of Uilrealized Incove (1925) 39 HARV. L. REV. 82. § 213 (a)
of Revenue Act of 1918 (c. 18, 40 STAT. 1057), reenacted without substantial change in
Revenue Acts of 1921 (c. 136, 42 STAT. 227) and 1924 (c. 234, 43 STAT. 267, 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 954) taxes "income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid."
The court followed Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. III, 50 Sup. Ct. 241 (1930), where a

husband and wife contracted that all their several earnings were to be received and owned
by them as joint tenants, but it was held that all the husband's income was taxable to him.
This would seem correct inasmuch as husband was under no existing contract of employment.8 Accord: Burnet v. Leininger, Sup. Ct. U. S., decided March 14, 1932, No. 426.
Barnes v. Comm'r, 7 B. T. A. 924 (1927); Blaney v. Comm'r, 13 B. T. A. 1315
(1928) ; Estate of Robinson, 4 B. T. A. 47 (1926); Ferguson v. Nelson, supra note 4.
Contra: Appeal of Browne, 3 B. T. A. 826 (1925); Appeal of Warner, 5 B. T. A. 963
(1926) (as to wife). In United States v. Mellon, 279 Fed. gio (W. D. Pa. 1919), affd, 281
Fed. 645 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), and United States v. Davison, i F. (2d) 465 (W. D. Pa.
1924) assigned income was held not taxable to the assignor. In Hall v. Burnet, 54 F. (2d)
443 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1931), where an insurance agent assigned commissions on renewal
premiums, it was held not personal earnings but a property right which was assigned and
so not taxable to the assignor. This distinction, also followed in the Ferguson case, seems
unsound. May there not be a property right in personal earnings to be earned under an
existing contract?
The Board of Tax Appeals has said that it is immaterial that a gift has been made to
avoid payment of taxes. Walker v. Comm'r, 6 B. T. A. 1142 (1927).
'O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d) 436 (D. Conn. 1928); Shellarbarger v.
Comm'r, 38 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) ; Young v. Gnichtel, 28 F. (2d) 789 (D. N. 3.
1928). In the O'Malley case, the court said, "After all, the stark fact is that the plaintiff
did not receive this income, and cannot receive this income. To say that she did receive it
is to indulge in a deliberate fiction." Cf. Mitchel v. Bowers, 15 F. (2d) 287 (C. C. A. 2d,
1926) where the court taxed the husband because the agreement made with his wife was
terminable
at will by either party.
' 0Magill, op. cit. supra note 6.
1 Ibid. See also cases cited supra note 8. In Ferguson v. Nelson, supra note 4, husband,
owner of a patent, assigned it to a corporation for exploitation, he to receive one-third of
net profits therefrom. He assigned to his wife all his interest in the profits of the contract
and notified corporation to pay such income to the wife, which was done. Held, taxable only
as income of the wife, the court distinguishing this case from Lucas v. Earl, supra note 7
and the instant case on the ground that there was an existing property right capable of
assignment. Quere whether under this decision a lawyer might escape taxation by a bona
fide assignment of retainer fees to his wife.
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SALES-APPLICABILITY OF THE SALES ACT TO SALES OF CORPORATE
STOCK-X, a stockbroker, ordered stock for plaintiff customer, from the defendant, his correspondent. Defendant had notice that plaintiff was principal, and
was paid for the stock. Defendant bought the stock, but before getting the
certificates, X became bankrupt owing him money. Defendant refused to deliver
the certificates to plaintiff, and was sued in trover. Held, that defendant was hot
liable on the ground that the certificates had never been appropriated to the
contract,' as required by section 19:4 of the Uniform Sales Act. 2 Wills v. Investors' Bankstocks Corporation, 178 N. E. 755 (N. Y. 1931).
A purchase of stock by a broker, through a correspondent passes title to the
stock, to the broker's customer as soon as the stock is acquired by a correspondent.3 Therefore, a refusal to deliver the stock to the customer on demand, after
payment of all charges due on the transaction, is a conversion for which the
correspondent is liable.' The court came to a contrary conclusion in the instant
case because it assumed that stocks are goods within the meaning of the Uniform Sales Act. "Goods" are defined by section 76 as "all chattels personal
other than things in action and money". While corporate stock is not, strictly
speaking, a chose in action,, but rather a right to share in corporation management, profits and assets on dissolution,6 courts have treated them as choses in
action, both before 7 and after the adoption of the Sales Act.8 Consequently,
with the single exception of section 4,' which is really a re-enactment of the
Statute of Frauds and which expressly covers "a sale of any goods or choses in
action", the Act, in view of section 76, has not been held applicable to these
stock transactions.'" Many courts on the contrary have expressly decided that

'The holding of the court, page 756, that "in order to pass property in unascertained
or future goods, 'appropriation' even with the assent of the buyer, must be more than a
selection on the part of the vendor, where he has the right to choose the article which he
has to supply in performance of his contract" is borne out by authority in cases other than
those involving corporate stock transactions. Low v. Pew, io8 Mass. 347 (1871) ; Proctor
and Gamble Co. v. Peters, 233 N. Y. 97, 134 N. E. 849 (1922) ; I WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed.
1924) §274; cf. Coolidge v. Old Colony Trust Co., 259 Mass. 5,5, 156 N. E. 70 (1927) to
the same effect where the subject matter was shares in a voluntary unincorporated association,2 without any mention of the Sales Act (adopted in Massachusetts in igo8).
N. Y. CONS. LAws ANN. (Cahill 193o), PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 82-158, adopted by the
Act of 1911, ch. 571.

'Hedges v. Burke, 147 Tenn. 247 S. W. 91 (1922); Davis v. McNair, 48 F. (2d) 494
(C. C. A. 5th 1931) (stock bought through banks).
'Hedges v. Burke, supra note 3; see Le Marchant v. Moore, i5o N. Y. 209, 216, 44
N. E. 770, 773 (1896); MEYER, LAW OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCIXANGES (1931)
493; cf. Horlacker v. Bear, 32 Pa. Super. 269 (igo6).
Smith v. Lingelbach, 177 Wis. 170, 187 N. W. ioo7 (1922). BALLANTINE, MANUAL
OF CORPORATION LAW AND PRACrICE (1930) § 130.
'Steinfeld v. Copper State Mining Co., 29o Pac. 155 (Ariz. 193o) ; Macaura v. Northern Assur. Co. Ltd. [192.5] A. C. 61g.
I Leffingwell v. Evans, 185 Ky. 351, 216 N. W. 58 (1918) ; Orr v. Hall, 75 Neb. 548, io6
N. W. 656 (io6).
'Burwell v. American Coke Co., 7 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. Ist, 1925); De Nunzio v.
Denunzio, 9o Conn. 342, 97 Atl. 323 (1916); Davis v. Arnold, 267 Mass. 103, 165 N. E.
887 (1929). These cases hold § 4 applies on the ground that stock is a chose in, action, not
goods. But cf. Davis Laundry v. Whitmore, 92 Ohio St. 44, 1iO N. E. 5i8 (1935) (holding

§ 4 applies because stock is goods).

'Jameson v. Redfield, 2 P. (2d) 53, (Cal. App. ig31) ; Indiana Fair Assn. v. Phillips,

328 Ill. 368, 159 N. E. 815 (1927) ; Adams, Inc. v. Thayer's Estate, 156 Atl. 697 (N. H.
ig31) ; Melnicker v. Winter, 3O.5 N. J. 278, 14.5 Atl. 318 (929).

" There have been dicta, however, irN at least two cases to the effect that the sections
of the Sales Act other than § 4 are applicable to the sale of corporate stock. See Davis Laundry v. Whitmore, supra note 8 at 52, i1O N. E. at 521 (here the court correctly held that sales
of stock were covered by § 4 of the Act but said that stocks were within the definition of
goods in § 76) ; Crichfield-Loeffler Co. v. Taverna, 4 N. J. Misc. 310, 312, 132 Atl. 494, 495
(1926) (dictum to the effect that the remedy under § 64:x is applicable to a failure to accept
stock under a contract, but this. it is to be noted, is the common law in stock transactions) ;
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sales of corporate stock are beyond the provisions of the Act; " with which view
Mr. Williston, the framer of the Act, agrees.:" In the light of this authority and
of the further fact that New York has also adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act,' 3 relating specifically to stock transactions, there seems to be little basis for
the court's 'opinion that the Sales Act was intended to apply to sales of corporate
security.'4
SALES-SALE OR RETURN-WARRANTY OF FITNESS AFTER LAPSE OF TIME

FOR RETURN-Plaintiff sold and delivered to defendant a weighing machine on
condition that the defendant might return the machine within thirty days. Within
that period defendant notified the plaintiff that unless the machine was repaired
he would return it. Plaintiff failed to repair and the defendant did not return the
machine until four months later. Plaintiff sued for the purchase price. Held,
that the defendant could not set off damages for breach of an implied warranty
of fitness. Columbia Weighing Machine Co. v,. Fitzgibbons, 43 S. W. (2d) 897
(Mo. App. 1931).'
In a sale or return, title passes subject to the buyer's option to rescind and
revest title.2 In the absence of provisions to the contrary, the exercise of the
option rests in the pleasure of the buyer,3 but it will be effective only if accomplished within the time set 4 and the manner prescribed in the contract.' The
cf. Vilsack v. Wilson, 269 Pa. 77, 112 Atl. 17 (1921) (court refused to express an opinion as
to whether the Sales Act applied to sales of stock).
'These courts were considering other problems than that covered by the Statute of
Frauds section (§ 4). Henderson v. Plymouth Oil Co., 13 F. (2d) 932 (W. D. Pa., 1926) ;
Smith v. Lingelbach, supra note 5; Millard v. Green, 94 Conn. 597, n1o Atl. 177 (192o) ;
cf. Guppy v. Moltrup, 281 Pa. 343, 126 Atl. 766 (1924). This case held that § 4 of the Sales
Act was unconstitutional because it includes shares of stock while the name of the Act "an
act relating to a sale of goods" does not show this as required by the Pennsylvania constitution. See also in this connection Note (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 32o. The title to the
act was amended to cover this defect by the Act of April 27th, 1925 P. L. 310, PA. STAT.
(West 1928) § 19652.
122 WILSTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 1557 n. 13, "In Davis Laundry, etc. v. Whitmore
[supra note io] there is a dictum that shares of stock fall within the definition of goods.
. .
This seems incorrect. The contrary conclusion . . . is sound. The actual decision
was right, holding as it did that a sale of stock was within the Statute of Frauds of the Sales
Act, but this is because in Section 4 of the Act its words, 'choses in action' are expressly
included. The statute in general relates to tangible property, but the section is broader in its
scope.'
IN. Y. CONS. LAws ANN. (Cahill 1930), PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 162-185, adopted by the
Act of I913, ch. 6oo.
"4Cf. Smith v. Lingelbach supra note 5, where the court said at 173, 187 N. W. at o08,
"In addition to the fact that the Uniform Sales Act by its terms excludes certificates of stock,
there is the additional consideration that in 1913, two years after the adoption of the Uniform
Sales Act, the legislature adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act which by its terms
relates specifically to the transfer of shares of stock in a corporation and would, therefore,
seem to be exclusive of the Uniform Sales Act."
' The UNIFORM SALES AcT has not been adopted in Missouri. A similar decision on
similar facts was reached in Columbia Weighing Machine Co. v. Kleckner, 130 Misc. 86I,
225 N. Y. Supp. I69 (927), decided under the SALES AcT.
2 1 Wn-uSTON, SAsS (2d ed. 1924) § 8.
' "The buyer may . . . elect to return the goods for any reason or without any
2 WILISTON, SALES at 552.
SALEs AcT, § 19, rule 3 (1) is a codification of the rule at common law.
Where the time is specified in the contract, the return must be made within that time.
Golden Gate Concentrator Co. v. Caplice, 23 Jon. & S. 439 (N. Y. 1888); Butler v. School
Dist., 149 Pa. 351, 24 Atl. 308 (i892). If a time is not specified the option must be exercised
within a reasonable time. Rumsey & Co. v. Bessemer, 138 Ala. 329, 35 So. 353 (1903).
Thus, as in the instant case, a mere expression of dissatisfaction is insufficient if the
obligation is to return. Columbia Weighing Machine Co. v. Smith, 26 Ohio App. 321, 159
N. E. 855 (1927); International Filter Co. v. La Grange Ice & Coal Co., 22 Ga. 167, 95
S. E. 736 (i918) ; Dickey v. Winston Machine Co., 117 Ga. 131, 43 S. E. 393 (903).
reason."

'UNIFORM
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problem raised in the instant case is whether a purchaser under a sale or return
agreement is precluded from asserting a warranty after the time within which
the article might have been returned has passed. The court held that the return
was a condition precedent to a warranty, thereby making a return imperative
in this situation. It is true that a contract may specify that failure' to comply
with certain conditions within a certain period shall be taken as conclusive
evidence of the satisfaction of all warranties, or shall bar the purchaser from
asserting a warranty. 7 In the absence of such a provision, however, it would
seem that a privilege of return should not disentitle the purchaser to those
remedies which he ordinarily has after acceptance. After acceptance a buyer,
with knowledge of a defect, may either keep the goods and sue on the warranty or may reject the goods and sue for non-performance of the contract.8
The only significance that might then be attached to the retention is a waiver of
the defectY There seems little reason for differentiating the buyer's remedies
on a sale or return from an ordinary sale, and less reason to invoke from a provision, which was meant to be for the advantage of the buyer, an implied condition which may work a hardship.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE-DEDUCTION OF COMPROMISE COST BEFoRE
DETERMINING TAx-To procure the probate of a will and the withdrawal of a
contest thereto, the residuary legatees paid a sum of money to the contestant, a
brother of the testator. Thereafter, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, under a
statute,' collected an inheritance tax on the entire residuary estate without making
any deduction of the amount paid to the contestant. Suit was then brought by
the executor to test the correctness of the tax. Held, that the tax was proper,
and that no deduction should be allowed. Cochran's Executor and Trustee et al.
v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 44 S. W. (2d) 603 (1931).
There is a sharp divergence of opinion as to whether or not such a deduction
should be allowed. Early Pennsylvania cases not only permitted legatees under
a will to deduct the cost of compromising litigation, 2 on the grounds that the
Where there are no terms in the contract fixing the exact manner of return and the
parties are at a distance from each other, delivery to the carrier is, as in the analogous case
of delivery by the seller, by some authorities held sufficient to pass title. McTeer Clothing
Co. v. Farrow Mercantile Co., 9 Ala. App. lO4, 62 So. 378 (1913). Contra: David Biow
Co. v. Cohen, 99 Vt. 78, 130 Atl. 589 (1925).
0 43 S. W. (2d) at 898. The court cited as precedent Columbia Weighing Machine Co.
v. Young, 222 Mo. App. 44, 4 S. W. (2d) 828 (1928). That decision rested in turn on the
decision in Yerxa, Andrews & Thurston v. Randozzo Macaroni Mfg. Co., 315 Mo. 927, 288
S. W. 2o (1926) which could hardly be asserted as direct authority since the contract of
sale in that case provided that failure to give notice within a specified time would preclude
the buyer from asserting any defect in the goods. The buyer failed to give such notice.
"Russell v. Legg, 1o S. W. (2d) 326 (Mo. 1928) ; F. A. Fay & Egan Co. v. Meredith,
36 Ga. App. 5o6, 137 S. E. 409 (1926). See also, in this connection, supra note 6.
' UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49. For the rule in Missouri see Edwards v. Noels, 88 Mo.
App. 434, at 439 (190). "In the case of breach of warranty, the vendor, although he has
accepted the thing sold with knowledge that it does not fulfill the warranty of the vendor,
yet hath still that covenant on which to rely and this covenant being one which is collateral
to the contract of sale, is not waived merely by acceptance of the thing purchased." This
situation is discussed and the rule here adopted is approved by Professor Williston. 2 WILLISTON, SA.xs § 488 and cases cited at 1269 n. 31.
See Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473, 484, 22 Atl. 362, 364 (1891).
Ky. Stats. 1924, c. III, § I, p. 329, a typical statute, taxing property "which shall pass
by will, or by the laws regulating intestate succession .
2 Pepper's Estate, i59 Pa. 508, 510, 28 At. 353, 353 (1894)
". • . they (legatees) are not
so liable (on the amount paid contestant), and for the reason that the amount paid the
caveator was never received by them as legatees"; Kerr's Estate, 159 Pa. 512, 513, 28 Ati.
354, 354 (894) : "The allowance or compromise of their claims simply reduces the estate
afterwards passing to volunteers, with the same effect as if the reduction had been caused
by payment of debts.
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amount had never been received by them as legatees, and that it was a proper
expenditure by the estate, but also refused to tax the amount paid to-the adverse
claimant, as not having been derived from the will or by descent." As to the
latter holding, Pennsylvania has since changed 4 and adopted the usual minority
view 1 in ruling that a tax is collectable from the heir-contestant, as a devolution
under the intestate laws, the will being rendered inoperative to that extent. Of
necessity, a deduction must be made from the taxable estate for such compromise
cost." It is theoretically unsound, however, to treat this deductible item as a
partial renunciation by the beneficiaries under the will, for the later compromise
agreement made by them presupposes a prior confirmation of the terms of the
will. The majority view, advocated by the instant case, is more logically unimpeachable not only in recognizing that the legatee asserts a domination over the entire residuary estate by settling the will contest, but also in denying any deduction
therefor on the sound doctrine that the estate passes to the legatee under the terms
of the will as written. The tax is imposed on that succession as of the time of
the testator's death and not on the basis of some subsequent contractual arrangement between the beneficiary and the litigious assignee.7 The minority decision
is practically preferable, however, not only because it secures to the State the
utmost income," which the majority rule may not,' but because it does so by an
equitable apportionment as between the legatee and the caveator, without burdening the former with a double tax, i. e., on his own portion as well as on that
received by the contestant. Further, it is desirable in that it encourages the settlement of litigation 10 by offering to the legatee the prospect of a deduction
from his taxable gift.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAX ON SURVIVING JOINT TENANT'S INTEREsT-A bank account was payable to "A and B or either or the survivor". At the

death of A, B's share in the estate was sought to be subjected to the collateral
inheritance tax. Held, that this is an interest in property passing to B on the
death of A under the Pennsylvania Act of May 16, 1929 1 and therefore taxable.
Gainey's Estate, 8o Pitts. L. J. 32 (0. C. Pa. 1932).
214 Pa. 525, 63 AtI. 1O2i (io6). Accord: English v. Crenshaw, 120
531, 110 S. W. 210 (1908).
' Taber's Estate, 257 Pa. 8I, ioi Atl. 311 (1917).
'Taylor v. State, 4o Ga. App. 295, 296, 149 S. E. 321, 321 (1929) : "Where the testator's
l

Tenn.

Hawley's Estate,

sole heir at law who is, by reason of being such heir, authorized to object to the probate of
the will of the testator, does so, and in order to induce the caveator to withdraw and permit
the will to be probated, the legatee agrees that caveator shall get a sum, which would have
gone to the heir but for the will, the property so received by the caveator passes by the law
relating to descents"; People v. Rice, 40 Colo. 5o8, 91 Pac. 33 (1907). Cf. State v. Probate
Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N. W. 9o2 (1919).
People v. Rice, supra note 5.
7
Baxter v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 459, 462, 95 N. E. 854, 855 (1911): ". • • these concessions (by legatees to contestant) take effect not because such is the will but because such is
the agreement, and whoever takes anything or loses anything by such concession . . . takes
or loses, as the case may be, under the agreement and not under the will"; In&re Estate of
Graves, 242 Ill. 212, 218, 89 N. E. 978, 979 (19o9) : "The whole of the residuary estate vested,
at the instant of his (testator's) death, in the residuary legatee. The inheritance tax was
then due and payable. The beneficial interest in the property then passed to the legatees and
their succession gave rise to the tax. Subsequent events did not affect it." Matter of Cook,
187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (19o7) ; In re Well's Estate, 142 Iowa 255, 12o N. W. 713
(909).
I Taylor v. State, supra note 5.
'See In re Murray's Estate, 92 Misc. 1OO, 155 N. Y. Supp. i85 (1915), where legatee, a
tax-exempt charity, compromised a contest with an heir, and no tax was imposed. Under
the minority rule, however, the sum paid the heir by way of compromise is taxable.
See State v. Probate Court, supra note 5.
P. L. 179..
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The interest of A and B in the bank account was that of joint tenants with
survivorshipY The interest which the survivor has in the estate has usually been
held not subject to inheritance tax,3 the theory being that his interest accrued at
the time of the creation of the joint tenancy and the death was a mere extinguishment of,4 or condition subsequent 5 divesting, the rights of the deceased joint
tenant, so that no interest has passed to the survivor by the death which could
be subjected to a tax. For this reason it might be contended that the aforementioned statute which was expressly framed to cover this situation would be unconstitutional as being a violation of the due process clause 8 in attempting to tax as
a transfer of an interest something which did not actually pass by death. In the
analogous situation of estates by the entirety the Pennsylvania courts have uniformly held that there is no taxable interest passing by death, 7 but the particular
reason and policy offering immunity to such estates render these holdings of little
value as precedent in the instant problem." Moreover, it has been held by the
United States Supreme Court that the interest passing to the surviving tenant by
the entirety is taxable under the Federal estate tax.9 From a strictly practical
viewpoint the interest of the surviving joint tenant before the death of the other
tenant was, in addition to the right of partition,'" merely a chance to obtain that
interest which he now has as survivor." Since joint tenancies and survivorship
are legal devices so framed that the incidents flowing therefrom shall serve
specific purposes, it would seem to follow that the ends for which these concepts
were designed will not be defeated by a practical recognition of the increased
rights in the survivor and a consequent taxing thereof.

TAXATION-LIABILITY OF RtGISTERED OWNERa OF REALTY AND OF OWNER

THEgEIN-Mortgagee foreclosed mortgage and bought
the property in at sheriff's sale. To protect his title the mortgagee paid taxes
assessed during the time the defendant was registered owner. In an action by
the mortgagee to recover these taxes the defendant proved he had not been the
OF BENEFICIAL INTEREST

-Redemptionist Fathers v. Lawler, 205 Pa. 24, 54 Atl. 487 (9o3)

in which Justice

Miller construing Act of March 31, 1812, 5 Sm. L. 395, PA. ST. (West, 1920 § 12735) said:
"Survivorship as an incident of an estate granted being still lawful, its creation becomes
a question of intent. No particular form of words is required further than that they shall
be sufficient to clearly express an intent in order to overcome the presumption arising from
the statute"; Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 141 Atl. 629 (1928) discussed fully in (1928) 77
U. OF
PA. L. REv. 29o; Bailey's Estate 4 Wash. Co. Rep. (Pa. I924).
3
Leach's Estate, 282 Pa. 545, 128 Atl. 497 (1925) ; McIntosh's Estate, 289 Pa. 509, 137
Atl. 661 (1927) ; Bailey's Estate, supra note 2.
' McIntosh's Estate, supra note 3.
Bailey's Estate, supra note 2. Contra: Carr's Estate, 3o Pa. Dist. 481 (1921) holding
that an interest passes to survivor subject to transfer inheritance tax.
I U.

S. CoNsT. A-mEND. 14 § I.

'Fink's Estate 6 D. & C. 799 (Pa. 1925) ; cf. Sloan's Estate 254 Pa. 346, 98 Atl. 966
(1916). By statute, supra note i, tenancies by the entirety are expressly excluded from the
operation of the act. It is generally recognized in Pennsylvania that no interest in property
held by the entirety passes on the death of one of the tenants. Cf. United States v. Provident Trust Co. of Pa., 35 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929) discussed in (1929) 78 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 572.
'Cf. Chandler v. Cheyney, 37 Ind. 391 (i871). It would seem that the reason for the
recognition of the estate by entirety is to secure the home property against the incidents
that ordinarily threaten it. It has become a legal postulate that an estate by entireties is held
not by moieties but that both husband and wife are seized of the entirety "per tout, et non per
my"; Stuckey v. Keefe's Ex'rs 26 Pa. 397 (1856). See also Shapiro, Estates by Entirety
(913)

61 U. OF PA. L. REV. 476.

States v. Tyler 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (1930)
OF PA. L. Rv. 233.
"Act of April 27, 1927, P. L. 46o §i.
n An indefeasible fee to the whole of the res of the joint tenancy.

'United

(i93o) 79 U.

commented upon in
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real owner, but a mere naked title holder for the accommodation of the real
owner. The defendant contended that the real owner was liable and hence he
should not be liable. Held, that the mortgagee could recover despite the liability
of the real owner for taxes because the owner of record also is liable for taxes
assessed while he was so registered. The PennsylvaniaCompany, etc. v. Bergson,
Pa. Sup. Ct., decided February 3, 1932.
It is generally conceded that no obligation rests upon the mortgagee to pay
taxes for property in the possession.of the mortgagor.1 The former may, however,
and often does pay the taxes assessed so as to protect his interests, and he is
thereupon permitted to step into the shoes of the municipality and is remitted to
all its rights by the doctrine of subrogation. 2 In determining, therefore, from
whom the mortgagee in the case at bar could recover, the court was inferentially
deciding to whom the municipality could look for the payment of tax assessments.
The nature of the liability of a tax assessment is generally fixed by statute 3 and
in Pennsylvania, a tax upon so-called seated realty imposes a personal obligation 4
upon the owner thereof as well as a lien upon the land itself.5 As a reply to the
registered owners who denied their liability on the ground that they were not the
real owners, the court in earlier cases 6 construed the word "owner" in the statute
to mean, the registered title holder, and declared that no duty rested upon the
assessor to investigate the validity of any transfer or to go behind the record of
title.7 While the holding in the instant case is in accord with the established con'Hogg v. Longstreth, 97 Pa. 255, 258 (18gi) ; Republic Building and Loan Association
v. Webb, 12 Pa. Super. 545 (1900) ; 3 COOoLEY, THE LAW OF TAXATION (4th ed. 1924)
§ 1263; 2 JONES, LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPRTY (8th ed. 1928) § 1451; 3 TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 616.
2
Hogg v. Longstreth, supra note I, at 259; Rawle v. Renshaw, 15 Pa. Super. 488
(igoo); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) § 2346; SHELDON, THE LAW OF
SUBROGATION (2d ed. 1893) 8 9.
Board of Com'rs Ness County v. Hopper, iio Kan. 501, 204 Pac. 536 (922); 3
COOLEY, op. cit. supra note I, at § 1326.
IPA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 2o953; Act of April i6, 1845, P. L. 495; I EASTMAN, THE
LAW OF TAXATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (I909) § 536 et seq.
The appropriate action to be brought under this act is assumpsit. Philadelphia v. Bowers,
2 D. & C. 6-53 Pa. (923).

Taxes are not apportioned among the different owners during the year and the owner
on the day the tax is assessed is personally liable for the whole of the taxes of that year,
even though he conveys the land during the year. King v. Mt. Vernon Building Society,
io6 Pa. 165 (1884).

Generally on the question of personal liability, see 3 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note I, at
§ 1327; GRAY, LIMrATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER (1906) § 1i72 et seq.
I PA. STAT. (West, i92o) § 1.5861 et seq.; Act of June 4, i9oi, P. L. 364.
'Stewart v. The Allegheny National Bank, 13 W. N. C. 256 (Pa. 1882); Neilson v.
Equitable Trust Company, i8 Pa. Super. 635 (90) ; Meyers v. Rental Income Corp., io
Pa. Super. 438 (i3o).
'Cases supra note
192o) § 209o4, requires

6. The Act of March 14, 1865, P. L. 320 § 2; PA. STAT. (West,
a registration of ownership for the purpose of assessment of taxes.

The Act of April 16, 1845, supra note 4, provides that suit may be brought "against the

person or persons returned and registered" as the owner. See also the Act of June 4, 1gor,
supra note 5, as to the definition of "owner" as used in the lien statute.
See for similar construction under a Massachusetts statute, Miner v. Pingree, 11o Mass.
47 (1872) ; Butler v. Stark, 139 Mass. i9 (1885).
In one Pennsylvania case the court refused to hold the record owner liable when it was
proved that the plaintiff mortgagee had full knowledge that the title was held on a mere
naked trust and held that the mortgagee's remedy was against the one who was known to be
the real owner. Rawle v. Renshaw, supra note 2, at 490. In several of the other cases the
court limits the rule of liability of the record title holder to those instances in which no
knowledge of the trusteeship exists. Nielson v. Equitable Trust Co., at 639; Meyers v.
Rental Income Corp., at 442, both supra note 6.
In Vestal v. Morris, ii Wash. 45T, 39 Pac. 96o (895), the assessing officials were held
to have failed to comply with the law for not assessing the tax to the known owner.
In the instant case the court in a dictum declares that regardless of any knowledge
that another is the beneficial owner, the plaintiff mortgagee should be able to recover from the
one appearing of record as owner.
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struction of the statute, the opinion is particularly significant for the construction
of another section of the statute 8 to the effect that the taxing body was not bound
to look exclusively to the owner of record, but might, if obliged to do so, fasten
an equal liability upon the real owner for unpaid taxes.9

TORTS-ABSOLUTE LIABILITY

FOR

DAMAGE

RESULTING

FROM

ULTRA-

HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY-Defendant, engaged -in hydroelectric development work,
kept a large quantity of dynamite in a hut, contrary to a Vermont statute, prohibiting storing of explosives within 50 rods of an inhabited dwelling.- The
dynamite exploded and the concussion caused injury to plaintiff's person and
property in her dwelling, more than 50 rods distant. The trial court charged
that, if the statute was disobeyed, there was an absolute liability for damage
caused by the explosion. Held, that the charge was erroneous, 2 but that the defendant was absolutely liable at common law, for all damage resulting from the
storing of explosives. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. CO., 54 F. (2d) 510
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
The traditional view of tort law has been that unless there is trespass or
nuisance, liability can be predicated only on fault. The instant case, following
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,3 decides that where the defendant is engaged
". . . it shall be the duty of every assessor, whenever he shall find any property to be
owned differently from the name in the proper assessment book, to report such change to the
chief engineer and surveyor, without delay, and the chief engineer and surveyor, if finding such
report correct, shall make the book of plans conform, by the proper entry, but without
erasure of any name." PA. STAT. (West, 192o) § 20910; Act of March 14, 1865, P. L.
32o, §8.
' It is to be noted that the person discovered to be the real owner is to, have his name
placed on the registry list along with that of the registered owner, as registered owners of
such property. The court construes this to mean that the real owner is to be regarded as
having been originally registered at the time the taxes were assessed and so is liable not only
for future assessments but likewise for past assessments which are unpaid.
It cannot be doubted that this additional remedy would prove of real importance in a case
in which the property is insufficient to satisfy the tax claim and the straw man is financially
judgment proof.
The intimation of the court that it will look to the real owner, if necessary, may become
of moment in the following situation. It is settled law in Pennsylvania that a trustee, unless
authorized by the deed of trust or by order of court, cannot invest in stocks or bonds of a
private corporation. In Commonwealth v. McConnell, 226 Pa. 244, 75 AtI. 367 (igio),
the court surcharged the committee for a lunatic for investing in the bonds of a private corporation secured by a mortgage, without prior court order. To avoid this restriction a
corporation may transfer title to a straw man, who then issues the mortgage, which would
appear to constitute a proper subject of investment by a trustee of trust funds. Will the
court, however, in an appropriate case look to the real owner to determine the validity of the
investment as it suggests in the instant case it could do with regard to the matter of taxes?
In all probability the court would not regard itself bound to do so by reason of the decision
in the case at bar, since it is so clearly based upon the tax statute alone.
'VT. GEN. LAws (917) § 71o9, Act of 1853, No. 35. "A person who keeps within fifty
rods of an inhabited building of another person . . . more than 5o lbs. of dynamite, shall
be fined."
2 The court in holding that there was no liability under the statute followed the great
weight of authority, to the effect that where a statute is disobeyed, there is no breach of
duty toward those who do not come within the group sought to be protected by the statute.
Baronkay v. Robinson, 247 N. Y. 365, 16o N. E. 400 (1928); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Wichter, 141 Okla. 175, 284 Pac. 297 (293o);

TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 2929)

176(a).
'Court of Exchequer, 3 H. & C. 774 (1865); Exchequer Chamber, L. R. I Ex. 265
(1866) ; House of Lords, L. R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868). For a discussion of the doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher, see BoHIxN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926), 344, The Rule it
Rylands v. Fletcher, reprinted from (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 298, 373, 423; Stallybrass,
Dangerous Things and the Non-Natural User of Land (929), 3 CAMiB. L. J. 376.
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in an activity such as storing or transporting 4 explosives, which contains great
risk of injury to persons not interested in its success, the one engaged therein is
liable for all damage irrespective of fault.5 This same conclusion has been
reached by other courts but only after the use of various devices to give the
appearance of adherence to the traditional view. Thus, where the explosion has
cast actual debris on the plaintiff's land, courts have found no difficulty in holding a defendant liable on a theory of trespass. 6 This, however, has logically
forced them to the ridiculous conclusion that where the harm was caused by
concussion only, no recovery was to be permitted. 7 Other courts have allowed
a recovery on a theory of nuisance.8 But there should be no nuisance unless the
condition is so bad that it could be removed by an injunction, and such a conclusion would, under the facts of the present case, make impossible a highly
important and desirable improvement.9 Other courts have sought to reach the

same result by the device of res ipsa loquitur,10 but this, if honestly applied,
merely requires the defendant, at most, to show by the weight of the evidence
that he was not careless." By hypothesis, the defendant in the present case
used due care and could be liable under an application of the res ipsa loquitur rule
only where that is merely a device to impose absolute liability under the guise of
fault, irrebuttably presumed.' 2 The court is to be commended for its refusal to
subscribe to unworthy subterfuges which have only led to logical difficulties. As
3
Professor Bohlen has pointed out,' a result such as that honestly reached in

'That transporting explosives was such an activity as fell within the rule of Rylands
v. Fletcher was dictum in this case. The court said at 515, "transportation of the dynamite
would have added to the danger without relieving the defendant from absolute liability,
had an explosion occurred while the dynamite was on the way."
'The court decided the instant case, which was concerned with storing of explosives, by
analogy to the cases where the activity was blasting. The court recognized that storing
explosives was not quite as hazardous as blasting but decided the difference was so slight
that the same principles of absolute liability should apply. At 513 the court has collected a
thorough list of blasting cases in which the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher was applied.
IAsheville Construction Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927);
Rafferty v. Davis, 26o Pa. 563, io3 Atl. 951 (1918). The result is the same where the
plaintiff's person as well as his property has suffered a direct injury, Louisville etc., R. Co.
v. Smith's Adm'r., 2o3 Ky. 513, 263 S. W. 29 (1923).
7 Gibson v. Womack, 218 Ky. 626, 291 S. W. 1021 (1927) ; Booth v. Rome R. Co., 140
N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893). Contra: McKenna v. Pacific Electric Ry., 104 Cal. App.
538, 286 Pac. 445 (193o) ; Feinberg v. Wisconsin Granite Co., 54 S. D. 643, 224 N. W. 184
(1929). These latter cases, without expressly saying so, apply what is in fact the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher by a stretching of the trespass doctrine, since they feel there is no valid
distinction between injury caused by flying debris and injury caused by concussions.
8
Kerbaugh v. Caldwell, 151 Fed. 194 (C. C. A. 4th, 19o7); Texas Ry. v. Nixon, 21
S. W. (2d) io98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). A criticism of this method of imposing liability
is to be found in Note (1931) 6 Wis. L. REv. 124, where the res ipsa loquitur device is suggested as the correct method of imposing liability.
" Professor Bohlen has pointed out that in these situations there is really no nuisance
involved "for there is no continuous condition created, which, while it exists, is offensive to
the senses or injurious to the plaintiff's property or his enjoyment of it." BOHLEN, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 305. In the instant case the court admitted that there was no nuisance saying
at 513, that the plaintiff being outside the group protected by the statute, "could not have
enjoined the storage."
I Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson, 287 Fed. 797 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); Thayer, Liability
without Fault (1916), 29 H~Av. L. REv. 8oi; Note (1931), 6 Wis. L. REV. 124. See especially (1932) 45 H.Rv. L. REV. 594, where the writer suggests the nuisance and res ipsa
loquitur devices as a justification for the result reached in the instant case.
I Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof
(192o) 68 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 307, at 315; WIGMOrE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2509.
This is in effect making a change in the substantive law while appearing merely to
exercise "the courts' long admitted power to supervise the jury's exercise of its function of
judging the effectof evidence produced before it." Bohlen, op. cit. supra, note Ii, at 310-1l.
I BOHLEN, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 415-6.
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the present case will permit highly useful activities to continue while insisting
that those benefiting thereby pay for the support thereof, an eminently desirable
result, impossible of achievement by a strict adherence to the principles of the
older tort law.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS FOR INJURIES TO OTHERS
THAN PERSONS EMPLOYING THEM-The defendant gasoline company lent and

installed a number of gasoline tanks in a filling station. Due to defective installation the gasoline partly evaporated and passed into a basement where the
plaintiff, an employee, in striking a match to burn rubbish, was injured by the
consequent explosion. Held, that the liability of the defendant for defective
installation extended to the employee plaintiff. Griffith v. Atlantic Refining Co.,
157 Atl. 791 (Pa. 1931).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the leading case of Curtin v. Somerset,'
forty years ago established the rule that a contractor's liability for defective
workmanship was limited to his employer and that no duty of care was imposed
as to third persons.2 Thus, the conclusion was reached that a contractor, employed
to build a porch for a hotel, was not liable to guests of the hotel who were injured
by its collapse. 3 In the recent case of Grodstein v. McGivern4 however, the
defendants, engaged to build a porch railing for a private dwelling, were held
answerable for injuries sustained by the wife because of improper installation.
The court stated that the defendants had knowledge of the intended use by the
members of the family and that the wife was not a third party within the meaning
of the rule barring recovery from independent contractors. Obviously before it
was possible to permit recovery by a third person it was necessary to admit that
a duty of care was owing to that individual. 6 In recognizing this duty the court
in effect reversed its former view, for nothing of a legal nature appears to distinguish the cases. If injury is to be expected from a collapse of the porch in one
case, it certainly should be expected in the other. A non-legal distinction can be
found, in that liability in the latter case is extended to a group which by its nature
is limited in numbers, whereas in the former the group may be a very large one.
Whether the court intends hereafter to recognize the duty and apply it without
arbitrary limitations or whether it will extend liability only to groups limited in
numbers, remains to be seen. The instant case provides no answer to the question; the court distinguishes it from the former cases on the ground that the
defendants still own the tanks and continue to make use of them in completing
their deliveries. 7 However, such continued business interest merely shows another basis for the imposing of an affirmative obligation, s which in the former
cases could more directly be found in a money consideration paid for the con1140 Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (i8gI).
'This became an established doctrine in Pennsylvania. Fitzmaurice v. Fabian, 147 Pa.
I99, 23 Atl. 444 (1892) ; First Presbyterian Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 3o Atl.
279 (1894).

'Supra note i.
'303 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (1931).

'This case and related problems are discussed in (1931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 195; see also
(1927) 4o HARv. L. REv. 886; (1929) 27 Mlcl. L. REv. 83z'Compare the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1o5o
TORTS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. i93o) §§:255, 274.
(ii6);
'For a discussion of the liability of bailors and other suppliers of personal property
for injuries due to defects see Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 413; TORTS RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. Inst. i93o) § 262.

'See Bohlen, Basis of Afirinative Obligations inthe Law of Torts (19o5), 53 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 29,

232, BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926)

33, 59.
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struction. Since the court recognizes the existence of a duty of care, its silence
as to the exact ambit of liability may be indicative of a tendency no longer to be
bound by arbitrary limitationsY

TRUSTS-DEATH OF TRUSTEE AS AFFECTING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
FROM THE

PRINCIPAL-BASIS OF ALLOWVANCE-Trustee handled and conserved

an estate of about $9,6oo for three years, in the course of which he collected
and reinvested two mortgages forming part of the corpus. Before the termination of the trust he died. The lower court refused to permit the executrix of
the deceased trustee to charge two per cent. on the corpus as compensation.
Held, that the lower court must grant a reasonable compensation, since the death
of the trustee, before the termination of the trust, did not affect his right to
compensation, for services rendered, out of the principal. Murray's Estate, 103
Pa. Super. 87 (1931).
Although the general rule is that commissions upon the corpus do not accrue, as a matter of right, until the termination of the trust,' the precedent death
of the trustee presents a universally recognized exception.2 The present case,
however, is the first such pronouncement by a higher tribunal in Pennsylvania. 3
The more difficult question concerning the basis of compensation, which confronts the lower court, shows little unanimity.4 In Pennsylvania, it has been
left, usually, to the discretion of the court guided by traditionally established
limits.' Flexibility is desirable, but in this situation it is submitted that a tangible
rule of computation may be applied. If we assume that the trust is to last two
years; 6 that the trustee has died at the end of one year; that the corpus, $Io,ooo,
will not vary from the time of the trustee's death: Then if at the end of two
years the trustee would have received $500 ,7 the amount due at death would be
'Cf. Caledonian
A. C. 584.

Ry. v. Mulholland, [1898] A. C. 216; Oliver v. Saddler & Co., (1929)

'Riter's Estate, 26o Pa. 168, io.3
Atl. 554 (I918).
'Widener v. Fay, 5I Md. 273 (i828); Young v. Hughes, 39 Ore. 586, 65 Pac. 987
migoI); Whitehead v. Draper, 132 App. Div. 799, 117 N. Y. Supp. 539 (19o9); Lloyd's
Estate, 23 Pa. C. C. 267 (i9oo) ; Weiser's Estate, 2o Pa. Dist. 454 (911).
Cases collected
in 7 A. L. R. I595 et seq.
' In commenting, twenty years ago, on the fact that there had been no pronouncement
by a higher tribunal, the court in Weiser's Estate, supra note 2, said: "This may be ascribed
to the fact that the correctness of the proposition has so strongly appealed to a sense of
justice and common sense that it has not been disputed; and therefore the question has not
come before the appellate courts for adjudication."
'Three per cent. was allowed on a principal of $40,000 in securities where trustee administered for fourteen years and received and disbursed about $25,0oo; Lloyd's Estate, supra note
2. One per cent. was allowed where trustee served for twenty-one years but had less duties
to perform: Wainwright's Estate, 25 Pa. Dist. 955 (917).
Three per cent. was allowed
where the corpus consisted of investments upon bond and mortgage and proceeds of sale of
real estate and trustee administered for a number of years: Makin's Estate, 7 Pa. Dist. 126
(i898). Three and one-half per cent. was allowed where trustee was required for over
twenty-one years to make various investments of cash corpus and manage such: Wiser's
Estate, supra note 2.
The general rule in Pennsylvania permits recovery of compensation for "adequate care
and trouble" and in "proportion to responsibility incurred and the labor and care bestowed".
Biddle's Appeal, 83 Pa. 340 (1877) ; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (7th ed. I929)! 918,
n. 90.
SThere are two possible situations here: (i) where the duration of the trust is for a
set period, or (2) where it is for the lifetime of a person. In thd latter case a mortality
table may be used to determine the probable duration of the trust.
The basis of determining the present value is 5 per cent. because that is the usual rate
of return on trust property.
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the present value of $250 one year hence. By diminishing the corpus in such
manner it would appear that the life tenant's income is being unduly reduced.
As a matter of simple mathematics this is not true, for the deficiency is made
up from the amount left in the corpus which represents the difference between
that which the trustee, would have received for the period he served had he
survived, and that which his estate actually receives. 8
8 To illustrate: Assume a corpus of $Io,ooo and the length of time the trust has to run to
be two years. The trustee dies at the end of the first year and so would be entitled to $250.
Taking the present value of $250, $238.io from the corpus the latter remains at $9761.9o.
Assuming, as we have all along that the average rate of return is 5 per cent., then the

life tenant should receive $.Soo for the second year. But the remainder of the corpus will
bring only $488.io. The difference of $ii.9o will be made up by taking that amount from
the corpus for the latter need be only $975o including the substitute trustee's compensation.

